[Music]youforeignhi everyone we’ll get started herethis is nicole perleroth i’ll bemoderating apanel with you today on counteringransomware which is obviously top ofmind right nowransomware is not a new threat it’s anold oneand it seems to for whatever reason begetting significantlyworse over the last year we’ve seenransomware hithospitals cities schools but alsoamerican mainstays like gas and meat andnba basketballminor league baseball and god forbid theferry to martha’s vineyardand sophisticated companies like quantathe apple supplierum so here with us today we have anamazing panel and just before i get intointros i have one housekeeping itemwhich is thatin the latter half of this program we’lltake questions from youthe audience so at any time during theprogram you can submit your questionsusing the qa function at the bottom of your screenwhen you do thatplease include your name and affiliationif you feel comfortable doing so so wehave some contextand now for intros so with us today inalphabeticalorder are sean joyce who is a principalat pricewaterhousecoopers advisorypractice where he is the leadin the global and us cyber securityprivacy and forensicshe is also the former deputy director ofthe fbiand the chief trust officer at airbnbuh we also have chris krebs who’s thefounding partner of the krebs steemosgroupand he’s also the director of sorryformer directorof the federal cyber security andinfrastructuresecurity agency cisa and he’s a seniornew mark fellowat in cyber security policy at the aspeninstituteraj samani is chief scientist at mcafeehe’s also the founder of no more ransomwhich is anorganization dedicated to helping thevictims of ransomwareand finally we have kemba walden who isassistant general counsel at microsoftin the digital crimes unitand she also was the co-chair and helpedlaunchthe public private ransomware task forcethat just came out with a verycomprehensive set of recommendations fortackling ransomwareso um the first question i’d like tothrow out to youall is why does ransomware suddenly feelso categorically different than what wehave experiencedin the past why do these ransomwareattacks suddenly feel sovisceral and i think i’ll start withyou chris and then we’ll move on fromtherehey nicole thanks uh thanks for thatit’s great to be herei you know i think it’s primarilybecause theythey hit key parts of the criticalinfrastructure community they hit thekind of capital centersbetween uh oil and gas and and foodsupply but but make no mistake thatthis has been an accretive trend overthe last several yearsuh the ransomware task force that kimbowas a part ofhas been uh focused on this issue sincelast summer and so it’sit’s not just oh it all happened all ofa sudden in the biden administrationthis has been something that’s that’swe’ve been building up to and i thinkthere are three primary reasonsuh first is that you know even as we tryto improve defenses acrossuh the the critical infrastructure inour businesses and our state localgovernments wewe still just can’t uh get the basicscovered because frankly the basics arestill hardthe second is that uh the the economicmodeluh supporting ransomware has beenvalidated time and time again and inpart it’s been enabled bycryptocurrencies andthe ability to transfer money outsidethe eye of the traditional fiat currencyand then third and finally is theseactorsuh these ransomware gangs have beengiven plenty of room to runthey have a safe harbor many of them inin russiaunder the watchful eye of the kremlinnow that’s not to say that these arerussian government-directed actions butnonetheless they’ve been given plentyroom to runand they just haven’t felt meaningmeaningful consequences so as long asthere’s vulnerabilitiesuh to exploit there’s money in it andthere’s no real consequences it willcontinuesean i wanted to ask you about that safeharborissue um you know some people have comeout and said we don’t have a ransomwareproblem we have a russia problemwhat is your take on on the safe harborissueand what can we do to address thisso thanks nicole and i think it kind oftags along with what chris was sayingrightwe have to have this multi-prongedapproach when we look at this andone of them is when you look at the topransomware variants whether it’s revoconti doppelpaymer there’s one thing incommonrussia right and i thinkwe have to establish like when you lookata whole government approach with theprivate sectorit’s that diplomatic law enforcementand unfortunately at times that militaryactions that are necessary and i thinkyou know there has to be a clear messagebetween you know president biden andputinthat this behavior is unacceptable andthere arered lines and i think you know i i wouldsayeven in my time in many a meetingthere was a lot of consternation aboutestablishing a clear red lineand i think anything right when i’veheard a lot of people describe this as anational security issuei would argue not only that it’s aneconomicissue which you know chris is touchingon that impacthas really pivoted to being thatespecially with colonialbut also a public health and safetyissueright and this is where i think thereare clear red linesthat that will not be something thatwill be toleratedand that there will be consequences andthat can range fromyou know many different things so ithink you know the administrationdefinitely has some things that wasexhibited yesterdayexercising one of those tools by youknow the doj and fbibut i also think the private sectorplays a key partnership role in thisyeah in combat if i remember correctlythe ransomware task force came out witha number of solutions on addressing safeharborthings like maybe withdrawing visasum you know to create some domesticpressure around safe harbor for cybercriminals could you lay outsome of those recommendations yeah sowe have to remember and i the task forcewas cognizant of this that theransomwareis the the deployment of ransomware isat the end of the criminalactivity right there are a lot ofthere’s a lot of criminal activity thattakes placeprior to even getting to the deploymentof the ransomwareum and so we took it from that lens whatcan we dointernationally to have an impact onthe safe harbor of all of that criminalactivity so one of the recommendationsas you pointed out was you know perhapsrevoking visas another would beyou know creating amore impactful uh sanctionsuh for right so there and then perhapshaving a globalorganizational structure that reallyfocuses resourcesum really focuses on targets across theentire criminalspectrum so that weattack this ransomware problem as theborderless problem that it is perhapsproviding more international or givinginternational organizingorganizations moremore lift to be able to really get atthose specific targeted countries thatare providing safe harbornot only just safe harbor for thecriminal activity but safe harbor forum you know loose cryptocurrencyregulation or know your customerregulationbut really using it as a global effortso some of thethe least sexy recommendations which ithink are the most importantare around the organizational structurearound international cooperationokay and sean i see you raising yourhand um did you want tojust want was saying like i think thoseare allgreat tactical recommendations but wehave to make surewith these recommendations and that’swhat i mean by redline so i think thetaskforce outlines some greatthings but like that should be done nowif you do this here are the consequenceswe will follow all the way fromolfact designation visa rightto arrest all of those things that iswhat i think we’ve beenlacking in the past and i think we’vedone uh sporadicreally uh actions to address itokay uh raj go aheadso and by the way i was a co-founder forno more ransom as opposed to the founderum i think we’re missing perhapsyou know the key issue here which is yeswe talk aboutdarkseid or conte ransomware but thereality isthe reason we’re seeing such a explosionof attacks and really why the impact isfelt so much is becausethe bad guys have got better andwe’ve effectively completely lost sightofthe true nature of the problem which isthere is now this affiliateor partner model and they’re effectivelygoing out and hiring individuals tobreak into companies to exploitvulnerabilities that quite franklyare not not sophisticated in other wordsthey’re getting into companies becausethe passwords are weak or systems aren’tbeing patchedand if we focus all of our efforts onas it was said earlier like a russiaproblem well what about this this entireecosystem of individuals that arebreaking into companiesand deploying ransomware it’s like youknow we’rewe’re effectively blaming the peoplethat are developing the tools as opposedto the people that are using the toolsyeah and what’s what raj is referring tothere in case some of you don’t know isthe fact thatreveal and darkseid the ransomwaregroups that held colonial pipeline anduh jbs hostage are ransomware as aservice groupsthey’re leasing out their ransomware andthe code and sort of the technicalaspects of these attacks to anyonewho’s willing to take the risk ofpulling them offand so they’ve really lowered the thebarrier to entryin this market and chris you raised yourhandi think i think kimba had hers up firstgo ahead keva thanks chris um yeah andthis will be short but the point i wantto make is really those are ransomwareuhmalware right conti are evil umdoppel right those are all the actualmalware that’s deployed at the end of along line of criminal activity like imentioned beforeso just as raj should explain umyou know these are criminal enterprisesthere may be more than one criminalenterprisethat uses a particular ransomware likeconti or our evilbut at the end of the day they haveaffiliates an affiliate might be able toget entry into a network uh there mightbe another affiliate that might have afew credentials to sellthere’ll be another affiliate that willuse malware to lateral into a networkand another affiliate that will actuallydrop the ransomwarethere’s someone that develops theransomware but you knowreally at the end of the day the workthat has to be done has to look acrossthe entire criminalspectrum right and that’s a lot of whatwe’retalking about in common we’re talkingabout it from different perspectivesum but at the end of the day you knowit’s the same cyber securityuh recommendations that we alwaysproduce right multi-factorauthenticationum watch your vpns and and remotedesktop protocols great justthose are the those are the buildingblocks the basics so that they cannotuh bank vulnerable access to sell to ato a manager of a ransomware enterprisei’m just gonna oh sorry i’m just gonnamove on to one other thing which isyou know in terms of how we break thisbusiness model and you’ve all done anexcellent job of articulatingjust how sophisticated the businessmodel has becomeum one of the controversial elementshere that’s increasingly drawingattention is cryptocurrencyyou know when i first started coveringransomware attacks 10 years agothey would hold a pc hostage for 100 or200 euros and say hey go buy a prepaiddebit card at this drug store and giveus the pin now they say give us50 million dollars in bitcoin preferablynot bitcoinuh preferably you know monero or or acryptocurrency that’s harder to traceso clearly cryptocurrencies have enableduh ransomware so how do we take that onwhy don’t we start with you rajyeah thank you so actually you knowwe’ve had a lot of debates aboutpeople suggesting to ban cryptocurrencybut i want to kind of give you aperspective in 2016the most prevalent form of ransomware inother words the most popular ransomwarefor something called gantt craband three years later they retiredclaiming to have made two billiondollarsnow do we honestly sit here and thinkwell you know what this particularmulti-billion dollar organizationwe’ve now effectively made it illegal touse cryptocurrency so they’re thereforegoing to stop doing this and i thinkthat’sreally quite far-fetched because if weif we you know if we bankbitcoin and if we ban you know any othercryptocurrency or any payment mechanismsthey will adapt and they will innovateand you know we’ve seen this withdarkseid you know thethe ransomware that’s been in the pressmost recentlythey’ve now got a new version andthey’ve actually had developers workingon that day and nightfor the last couple of months so theywill innovate and they will adapt and soi thinkjust suggesting well you know it’s onlyone country or just suggestingactually it’s only one technology isisn’t appropriate in my opinionwhat about enforcing or better enforcingknow thy customer and anti-moneylaunderinglaws on the cryptocurrency exchangesseani’ll probably throw that one at youyeah so nicole i think there’s a lot ofwork going onwith that right now as you see some ofthe major banks like jp morganb and y melon right uh allowing anddevelopingtheir crypto currency capabilities and ithink kycis a big part of it right as we look ithinklegislatively and from a regulatoryperspectiveunfortunately we’re just behind thedigital curveright and i think regulators andlegislators struggle with understandingwhat these mean and how they fit intothe business modelso you know absolutely i think you knowthe group is making a great point rightransomware is just another form ofmalware and this problem is going toexistand morph and change over time and i andi thinkin that regulatory environment andlegislative environmentthat we’ve really got to pick up thepacechrisyeah i i look i think what you’rehearing throughout this conversation isthat there’s no silver bulletthat you know improving defenses aloneisn’t going to stop this uh becausesomeonewill will miss a legacy vpn hanging offthe edge of the network somebody’s it’sjust gonna happenum so i am generally from acryptocurrency perspectivethis is this is just one of the thedebates right nowand my sense of things is that uhthe the immediate course of action is topick up where the last administrationleft off and droppingsome of the know your customerrequirements it was an 11th hourexecutive orderuh introduced i’m sorry that was theinfrastructure service this was atreasury department issueuh in november december i understandthis administration wants to follow thatknow your customer model as well as someof the anti-money laundering andterrorist financingrequirements they’ve done it before 20years ago if you know as the fbi saysthis approaches 911there are a number of tools implementedafter 9 11 that i think we could mapover here to cryptocurrencybut but that alone is not going to solveand also you know wei think we need kind of a policy debatewithin uhyou know western democracies of wherechris cryptocurrency fallsin terms of acceptable or you know withwithin the banking industry because it’salready been adopted in chinaare we going to see globalcompetitiveness and innovationentirely to china on this one and i amyet to see a technologylike cryptocurrency that’s broken thethreshold just wither and diei don’t think that’s reasonable so howdo we manage the societal harmsum and continue to be competitive andopen for innovation on oncryptocurrencieswe did see oh sorry go ahead kemba umyeah i just wanted to add thatblockchain technology is innovativeand and i think is here to stay um andfor very good reasonone of the things that we learned on theransomware task force though is thatstakeholders that are part of the cryptoeconomy uhdon’t want their technology to be usedfor nefarious purposeseither um and so i think there areopportunities toto work with stakeholders in thein the blockchain community and in thecryptocurrency economyto be able to find meaningful ways toexpel the nefarious activity off ofthose platformsum the other aspect here to breaking thebusiness model that comes up again andagainis the role of insurance companies inthis spacefor a long time insurance companies havenow started to calculate that it’s stillcheaper to for these companies to paythe ransomthan to suffer the kind of destructionthat we saw with the not pecha attack afew years ago when companies like fedexhad 400 million dollars worth of damageand you think well you know now thesegroups like far evil or revealwhatever we’re calling them these daysare demanding 50 million dollarsin ransom it’s still cheaper than that400 million dollars in damage so we sawaxa the big french insurance giant theother week saying that they’re not goingto coverransom payouts anymore and you knowironically a few days later they wereheld hostage with ransomware and wedon’t know if they’ve paid uhyet but what what should we be doingabout the role of insurance companiesin this space rajwell that’s a a challenging questioni’ve often said thatcyber insurance is too immature for themarket that we have todayum equally we’ve alsoseen i wouldn’t call it evidence but atleast some degree of inference thatorganizations that have cyber insuranceare targeted more so than those thatdon’t have cyber insurance and certainlysome of the chat discussionsand negotiations that we’ve seen betweencriminals and victims have beenalong the lines of well you haveinsurance and therefore they’re justgoing to paylook i think cyber insurance itself isfine but the default policy to pay outis causing more harm to the wider marketyou know when we first started trackingransomware we were dealing with paymentsofthree to four hundred dollars and now wehave companies that are being demanded50 millionso clearly there’s something that’sfuelingthe the exponential rise in demands andi would argue that a part of that isthis default policy to paymm-hmm chris raised your hand yeah i ialso thinkas a result of some of the conditionsthat raj laid out the market is startingto correcti mean you saw axa declare that they’renot going to pay out anymoreum you’re starting to see morecompanies write either more narrowlyconstrained or more constrictedpolicies i just i think that you knowinsurance as uh payoutsstart moving towards 100 the market’snot there anymore and insurancecompaniesmay move away uh but you know there maybea positive out of all this where youknow thereare insurance companies that do the workthathave the the data to back it up andrequirecertain uh security considerations andcontrols and it can validate and attestto thosebefore issuing a policy and sean youknow the fbi has long saidwe really advise you not to pay but thishas never beena rule um you know why why not make it alawthat that victims of ransom or attacksshouldn’t paybecause i think there are so manynuances involved and so when you justlook atcolonial you know is it more importanteconomically to the countrythat we had all had gas to be able totravel for the long weekend and theholidayand in the impact there and then be ableto do something reactively like they didon the seizureso i would tell you i think i’ve learneda lot in my private sectorjourney and realizing that it isn’talways black and white there are a lotof nuances so icertainly would be discouraging anyoneto payand looking for those avenues where youcan avoid that but i think there isthere’s no clear cut right i think everysituation is differentthe impact is different take forinstance if you have a hospitaldo you want that hospital to be down forhow longtype of thing so i i think it’s a littlebit more complexbut i do think we should be doingeverything and that companiesshould be working side by side with thegovernmentfrom the beginning and that’s where ithink you are able to give yourselvesthe mostright the options that you can takedoing thatyeah and here we should probably put upa big red adfor nomoreransom.org whichuh raj helped co-found because as rajcan probably tell youum they’ve helped decrypt uh a lot ofthis ransomwarefor people who have come to them and andsaved something like 600 million dollarsin ransom payouts going to cybercriminals so raj if you want tospeak to that briefly it’s good forpeople to know and andand i’d also like to ask you you knowwhy don’t peopleuh make that sort of initial effort totry and decrypt this ransomware beforejust paying like we saw was colonialpipelineyeah so um with ransomware themisconception is that there’s twooptionspay criminals or don’t pay criminals andactually no more ransom is ajoint initiative with law enforcementand private sector companieswhere we give away free decrypters uh wedon’t ask you for your email address wedon’t track you at alland we will tell you the version or thetype of ransomware you’ve been hit byand whether there is a working decrypterthat you can freelyuse to get your data back and just sorryone minor point as wellum we’ve been talking as though payingthe ransom gets your data backwe have to acknowledge that many of thedecryptersthat are developed by the ransomwaregroups are actually rubbishso even if you pay a you may not getyour data back or you may not get adecrypter like wannacryand even if you do get a decrypter itmight be absolutely uselesskemba can you speak to some of the taskforce recommendationson this issue you know another thingthat’s come up i believe in the reportwas that we need a 9 1 911 or 311for ransomware attacks right sothe way that we approached it we feltthat there are somesome precursors that need to take placebeforewe decide to make a law that says thatransomware payments are prohibited oneof those iswe have to prepare governments to beable to absorb the economic impactof not paying ransomware just as sean itmentioned solike a a recost recovery fund would besomething that would be appropriateperhaps finding opportunitiesfor businesses to havealternatives to paying a ransom muchlikeraj had explained but not everyjurisdictionis at the point where it can support theabilityto outlaw or ban ransom paymentsjust as sean and explain there are a lotof nuances to this to this processum so the report really focuses onwhat are those building blocks that thatwe need toto focus on before we get to the pointofprohibiting ransom the other thing iwant to point out umthe report also focused quite a bit oninformation sharing and victimnotificationand i i view what happened then withcolonial pipeline in the last 24 hoursin thefbi action and doj action to be a greatadvertisement forinvolving law enforcement earlynotifying law enforcement early umbecause you know it because it opens upa lot ofopportunities not only for the victimbut alsouh for the security community to be ableto do something about iti thought that was a really clever twistyesterdaythat you know here we were when colonialpipeline paid the ransom and nobody wasreally applauding them at the time fordoing that and now we learn thatactually they did tip offthe fbi and it’s allowed the fbi totrace the paymentand to publicize the fact that they wereable to get it backand offer really a carrot for othercompaniesto report their ransomware attacksbecause there’s a chancegovernment government might help themrecoup their payment chrisso i think the outcome of yesterday isis a great thinguh particularly for uh the at least thebottom line of colonialbut i would really hesitate trying tomake thissort of uh engagement mainstreamright it’s not the fbi’s job to go outthere and claw back moneyfrom criminals once they’ve taken it andyou know i think it’s a bad publicpolicy outcome too because rememberthey only got 2.2 out of the 4.4 orwhatever so there’s stilla lot of rent out there somewhere thatsomebody’s benefiting fromand as i understand it what was capturedorclawed back was the affiliate and ifyou’re just targeting affiliates it’swhack-a-molethe dev crew that that really owns thecode for the ransom for the for thethe lock-up they they got theirs andthey’re skating somewhereso i think yeah we need to take a deeperdive and look at what happened here ialso thinkthey’re probably some facts left to cometo light on exactly the mechanics ofwhat happened here and whether thosecome out or notwe’ll see but but yeah good outcome butthis is not something that i think wewant to see mainstreamsean yeah soyou know like chris i look at yesterdayas a great first stepbut just one one small tool in thearsenaland i would look at i think what’s moreimportantis almost that mandatory reportingto the government if you set that upthat’s wherelike kevin was saying we all are sayingyou just open the aperture foropportunity and to do this togetherand and that is where i guess i’m apretty hard line like should bei’ll just okayso go aheadoh we were just checking okayum so another questionthank you sorry another question is whatcan companies doyou know it’s been infuriating almost toseethat patient zero for the watertreatment facility hack which wasn’transomwarewas um you know some old account thatwasn’t using two-factor authenticationwith a compromise passwordand again that’s basically what thecolonial pipeline hack came down to asbloomberg reported last week it camedown to anold employee account that was forwhatever reason still activea compromised password and an accountthat didn’t use two-factorauthenticationso how do we get companiesto just start doing the bare basics andlike chris said earlier the basics arehardbut we’re not even trying in a lot ofthese cases how do weincentivize companies to take this veryseriouslychris i uhi i do really honestly feel like we’reat an inflection point i i think thatwe’ve had a lot of conversation aboutpublic-private partnerships andencouragingthrough um you know whatever sort ofincentives and you know from anincentives perspective keep in mindthat incentives can be both a carrot anda stick and i think what you saw out ofthe administrationwith their executive order the cybersecurity executive order a month or soagoum there will be trickle-down effectsthere from improveduh software development lifecycle frombuilduh bill of materials all sorts ofbenefits that willaccrue to not just the federalgovernment but also theprivate sector by extension becausethey’re going to buy the same softwarebut i think to the bigger issue we needto take a hard look at criticalinfrastructurewhat those most critical of critical areas is the cyberspace solarium is callingthem thesystemically important criticalinfrastructure so if you’rein a place wherever you sit in the inthe economywhere if you get pulled out that there’sa appreciable and meaningful impacti think there are some standards thatyou’re going to have to live up to andi i think that’s what’s coming nextyou’re you’ve already seentsa issue an initial directive onincident reportingto pipeline uh the pipeline sector withprobably standardsfor security baseline standards at leastcoming later this this monthor rather the summer i’d expect i thinkthat’s where it’s going i think that’scongress has finally come around on ituh in in industry to a certain extent isis probably looking for a little bit ofcertainty on what it’s going togive them from a liability protectionperspective as wellcome back sure umjust to add on to what chris explained ithink we you’ve heard thismore and more but go back to the basicsright two-factor authentication segmentyour networkum use um reliable antivirusjust automate it but i think alsoin the private sector board rooms arebeginning to understandum what resources they need to putinto not just their informationtechnology butinto their security practices and ithink that’s wherea lot of the gaps might still exist isthatcisos and and security departments andmostin a lot of private sector companies arejust under resourcedum to tackle a big problem and thenyou know phishing training just thebasics for cyber security hygiene ithinkisn’t emphasized enough are therelessons from other countries we canborrow i remember there was a studydone with symantec’s data a couple yearsagowhere it looked at the ratio of uhsuccessful attacks versus totalattack attempts on various serversand it found that actually the countriesthat had the best ratiowere in scandinavia when they dug intowhyscandinavia was better off than the restof usa lot of it came down to a comprehensivenational cyber security policy and aculturearound security awareness you know theydon’t just have the click-throughanti-fishing training that we all haveto do at our various organizations theyactually make itreally crucial to the new hireon-rampingyou know are there lessons to beborrowed from that here would thatwork here um you know can we implementthat kind of cyber security strategywhen we’ve seenbusinesses and the u.s chamber ofcommerce so reticentuh to enact meaningful cyber securitylegislation and requirements forbusinesses raj go aheadso i would argue we don’t need astronger security cultureto acknowledge having a password of onetwo three four fivefor your critical assets out on theinternet is a bad thingthat’s not a security culturerequirement that iscommon sense and you know i don’t meanto sound dismissive butwe claimed this to be a sophisticatedattackwe claim that the adversaries are youknowsophisticated attackers but they’reusing weak passwords that they buy forthe less than the price of a cup ofcoffeethey get inside networks and i’ll and iwill tell you thatthey aren’t stealthy i mean they’reincredibly noisythe tools that they use should set offalertsacross the environment and solike i said i don’t think this is asecurity culture requirement i don’t andequally i wouldn’t necessarily say thatyou know one nation is doing it betterthan the other this is a globalphenomenon andyou know the reality is the adversarieshave no fearthey don’t think they’re going to getcaught and invariably they don’tso you know in my opinion what we needto dois collectively and globally enableprivate sector and public sector tobetter gather digital evidence to holdthose individuals accountablebecause they will continue to do thisbecause they fearthey don’t feel as though there’s anyrisk in any way shape or form forcarrying these outthese attacks out sean you’ve been onthe front lines of some of these attacksand seen how they startum you know what do you think it’s goingto take to get companies tomake two-factor authentication universala lot of people sayit’s a lot harder than it sounds it isin going back to raj said i guess iwould take a little different view ithink we do lack a security cultureright in in this space and it is i i usethe analogywould we leave all of our buildings justthe doors openand would that be okay would we acceptthat and it’s the same way with likeleaving someone’s password in the openspace is like leaving an extra set ofkeysso i really think right that we needthat regulationby sector and you know look much likethe tsa directive that came outnf in the financial services the occ andthe fed are looking atthose regulations i think thoseneed to be actually established becausei go back towhat is the economic model to make theprivate sectoractually do this and that is thequestionbecause forget about the you know thegreat companies like microsoft whereit’s part of their business and in thefabric of what they domost companies are not microsoftand that’s where i would say we needthat regulationby sector that needs to be i thinkfocused on that much like we’re seeingit on theon the critical infrastructure um i’mjust going to startuh asking some audience questions i seeone here from my friend vijayuh gerbasani the director of center atthe center for digital transformation atuc irvineand he had a similar question butphrased a little differently which wasum well the focus today is on ransomwareis there a rolefor a mandate for certain cyber securitypractices along with penaltiesfor economically important companieslike we do intraditional audits like sarbanes-oxleyceterashould we make some of these minimumcybersecurity requirements uh you knowa regulation by law we mandate that youhave tohave strict password procedures andregular patch management and two-factorauthenticationand encrypt your important data is thatrealistickembai was hoping you weren’t going to throwthat one to meso so i think uma couple of things about that firstwe have to recognize that like sean saidnot all not all private sector is thesamethey span across different criticalinfrastructures they span betweensophistication and um whether they’relarge companies or small companiesso the answer is it’s possible but we’renot really in a space yet to be able todo that umand i’ll and i’ll explain you know wehave to haveas part of the ransomware task force werealized that there’s a lot ofinformation out there it’s just not inanindigestible form for everyone so firstwe need to do thatand then perhaps bisector though thatgets sticky for its own reasons butperhaps bisectorhave the regulator require those minimumbaselines once we’vebrought it to a point where it’sdigestibleideally it would be nice to have anational levelregulatory requirement process but we’refar far from that and and it’s unclearwho would do thatso i don’t know if that’s the simpleanswer to the question but that’s that’sthe best i’ve got for right nowum this is a this is also a similarquestionum but applies to some of thelow-hanging fruit unfortunately thatkeep getting hit with ransomware so thisis fromstephanie helm and maurice turner whoboth asked similar questionswhat are the tactical steps for localgovernments and schoolsto counter this it is not a fair fightcan state and local law enforcementbuild sufficient capacity to be the leadagencies for ransomware attacks onindividuals or smallorganizations chrisi um so you asked two questions there ithink ormaurice did um one is how can they bebetter prepared and then how can they bea supporting resource forbusinesses in their community and ithink that’s the right sequencingbecause there’s a heal thyselfuh element of this first and i thinkthis is where actually the us congresshas a great opportunitywhether it’s in the infrastructureinvestment act that’sunder debate uh or some other fundingmechanism where we we have to have aninflux of cashto state and local partners so that theycan make the modernization jumpright now and they’re going to have aharder time with that given some of thethe covet or the tax revenues that havedropped off due to covet sowe need to get state local securityupliftpronto that’ll then put them in aposition toprovide additional uh resources andsupportat within their communities but i thinksysa has ahuge responsibility and role herein continuing to build out boots on theground type of support and assistancenot building anything not deployinganythingbut engaging supporting advising uhtraining all those sorts of just barebones building blocks securityassistancethat the federal government shouldrightly providegiven where we are now where everyoneseems to be getting hitum are there more creative optionsavailablelike would there be something where amicrosoft would sort of supplement thesalariesof some of its best security engineersand send them to do a tour of duty wherethey would go aroundsome of these critical uh state andlocalorganizations and help them findvulnerabilities and patch them and shoreuptheir defenses chris one of the thingsthat i’ve been thinking about isis regional consortia uh inpurchasing from the big technologycompanies whether it’s it’s microsoftaws google it doesn’t matter but it theto the extent that we can get moreorganizations grouping together in howthey buyand having a more standardizeddeployment same thing should happen inthe federal government there shouldn’tbe 101 differentinstances of office 365 or whatever themail isthere should be a single standard that’seasier to defend monitor log in respondto the same thing should happenacross state and local governments umand so i think that’s one areawhere i would start for suresean um what do you think about sort ofovercoming the talent shortageuh that we already have to help some ofthese state and localmunicipalities and schools uh shore uptheir cyber security defensesyou know i i look at a lot of what we’redoing is kind of ashort term medium term and long term andi do thinklike cyber security education needs tobegin in elementary school for all of usfor that justgeneral awareness and continue becausethat’s kind of working inthat fabric and that culture that ithink we all need to knowliving in a digital world but as far asis the shortage i think we need to tolookat the private sector and the governmentto really help right these areas likechris was referring to i think kemperyou mentioned itright i think we have to figure out andthen i think we have toincentivize some of these things like wedo a girls encodingi think with microsoft i know you dosome things we have to continue to besponsored these activities to we’regoing to have this shortage for sometime i thinkglobally it’s 3 million and it’s notgetting any lowerso i i think we’ve got to use a varietyof different things to reallyuh increase the number of folks eligibleyeah kemba did the task force look atthis at the talent shortage issue andand how we can sort of sharetalent uh to shore up our defenses rightnowwe didn’t look at it as a separate umwork streambut it did come up quite a bit while wewere working through all the differentwork streamsjust the fact that there is a talentshortage i do know thatdhs senate secretary mayorkas isgoing to do a sprint on cyber workforcenextand there is a push and there was aconversation aboutexactly what sean brought up which isthat it starts it should startearly we should start thinking aboutthat first cyber job or that firstsecurity job and whether certificationreally is required whether they’realternative educate you know sources ofeducationum looking at alternative backgroundsthatthere’s something for everybody anddeveloping that culture i thinkis the next step but no we didn’t have aseparate recommendation relatedexclusively to cyber workforce one ofthe things i actually have to correctsomething i said earlier about the watertreatment hack in oldsmar florida wasit wasn’t just a compromise password itwas the fact that they were usingdecade old windows software so howdo we get these victims to ripout this old unsupported software thathasn’t received security updates inyearsand replace it with new software what isthe what is the number one thing we cando rajwell in some cases it’s almostimpossible toremove some of these older operatingsystems i mean i think windows xp stillhasover one percent of the global operatingsystems out onout there um and equally in criticalinfrastructure environmentsthere are certain systems andapplications that quite franklyaren’t going to be upgraded because theapplications they use are quite oldthemselvesbut in those deployments you would lookto have protection to goaround it so you know you would look tohaveprotection for example in the network sothe onlyuh systems that can communicate withthese archaicoperating systems would be it would beclearly defined and clearly articulatedand sothere are ways to address it withouthaving tocompletely rip everything out andrebuild from scratchcorrect so ii you know i appreciate the thrust tothe question but i also think that wehave to keep in mind that technologiesparticularly those that are internetconnectedum whether they’ve been deployed in thelast six months or the last 16 years orwhateverare done so to make our lives easierto make our business processes efficientand that’s going to bealways the first imperative and so it’sthe closer we can lash up securitywith functionality uh that’si think that’s the goal but keeping inmind thatyou know oldsmar probably doesn’t haveis it municipal utility and again i’mnot going toget into what happened down there it’sbeen interesting that we haven’t had alot more insight than what happened inoldsmar but nonethelessum it’s a it’s a utility they’reprobably late rate limited sothey don’t have a massive i.t upgradeand security budget so those are thesorts of deltas that we need to thinkabout how to overcomehow do the 30 000 water facilitiesacross the united statesget the appropriate training educationsecurity capabilitiesthat they need for instance and i knownicole water for you is ais it is a big area but it you know wethink aboutindustrial control systems whenever wetalk control system it tends to bewith the electricity grid but the numberof water facilitiesfar outweighs at least the controlsystems and water facilities faroutweighs the gridand so our our control system uhissue i think that’s not just over thehorizon but right here todaythat’s what that’s probably the biggestunder discussedchallenge on the congress and in some ofthe policy circles that we’re going tohave to tacklesooner rather than later thank you yesthis water is my is my nightmarescenario because it is the silent killerbecauseas we saw in oldsmar florida they got inand and upped the level of lyelye in the water using the remotechemical controls okay here is aninteresting question this is fromrichard depirofrom sampo international insurance it’sa little bit of a twist on know yourcustomerregulation on crypto but he saysyou mentioned know your customer in thecontext of crypto but manyattacks being launched use cloudinfrastructure located in the u.sshould the u.s government enforce a knowyour customer regulationon u.s hosting providers such as awsor should those companies be held liablefor attacks utilizing their networksso i might throw this back to you chrisbecause i believe this was somewhataddressed in the last executive order tocome out of the last administrationso i think that this is probably one ofthethe biggest challenges in the biggestareas for discussion so we alreadytalked aboutthe ofac designation uh the last it wasone of the last securityexecutive orders as you mentioned thatdropped it you know on the 19th i thinkjanuary 19th but i do think that thereneeds to be some bare minimumof understanding who is leveraging someof the cloud infrastructure that’s basedin the united states i mean if we’regoing tohold uh our our you know foreignpartners orothers to a to a standard we need tomake sure that we’re doinguh the necessary oversight andgovernance here within the united statesi thinkthe big companies um some of thehyperscale cloud companies do a prettygood job of this but i think there areothersfor instance uh some of the hostingproviders that just do thenot even the bare minimum and letanybody uh anonymously jump on theirplatformsso there’s a little bit of uh i thinkthere’s a lot more discussion policydiscussion around this that needs tohappenbut it is an area for exploration on thehill certainlyand kemba maybe you could speak to thatfrom maybe not from microsoft’sperspective but from your own personalperspective so from my personalperspective andin my experience and keep in mind i usedto work for chrisum i think i think there is some valueto a know your customer-likeuh process in in the cloudum but i agree that there there needs tobe much more policy discussioni i understand the thrust of the lastuh executive order of the administrationaround thati agree with the the you know bottomline principles andwhy that came out um but i do think itit it warrants more discussionokay um this is a great question this ismy favorite question so far this comesfrom michaelfigarosa he says much of the discussionhas focused on highly resourced victimsand has steered toward the standardhygiene argumentthat has been leveraged to justify agrowing cyber defense equity gapat what point do we begin to hold techcompanies more accountablebeyond the traditional update and forgetbehavior and this has beenone of my favorite topics which is youknow here in silicon valley we’re stillvery muchoperating on the mark zuckerbergphilosophy of move fast and break thingsyou know get your software to marketcapture as much market share before thecompetition and you can worry about yoursecurity problems laterwith things like remote software updatesthat a lot of people just don’t botherto run sohow do we address this without uhhampering u.s competition and slowingdowninnovation you know how do we addressthe core problemthat we are just rolling buggy softwareuh into so much of our devices but alsoour critical infrastructure sure chriswell i think like i already referencedthe administration’s executive orderis going to address a lot i think of theuncertainty around some of thethe software security measures that arein place and and like i said that youknowsoftware companies whether it’smicrosoft or anyoneuh you’re not gonna if you’re selling tothe government you’re not gonnabifurcate your development linesum to sell to the government vice theprivate sector so there’ll be thecascadingeffect from uh from government intointo the private sector um but but butagain keep in mindthat from a product liabilityperspectiveyou typically don’t have a anintelligent actoractively looking to exploit uh the thingand that’s the that’s a differencebetweenyou know whether it’s cars or whateverinanimate objectsso there’s always going to be thatbalance we certainly want to putu.s companies in a position to beglobally competitive if not dominant inthe software space that benefitseverybody sowe’re going to have to strike thatbalance i think this executive order isa good start but certainly morework needs to be done across theecosystemsure sean yeah i just want to addto what chris said i actually think theyou know go ahead and break things isnot where we are right now as a countryright and and i look at that i think itbecomesa matter of trust and we’ve seen appledo this withprivacy and i think we’re seeing othercompaniesas society in general looks to theprivate sectorto really be the custodians of thattrust whether it’s your dataor whatever it might be and and i reallythink this kind of devsec ops rightwhereas security is embedded in themiddleof any product you’re developing and theoperationalthings that it can do is going to becritical to how we move forward soi really do think it’s all about thissort of trustparadigm and how we have an obligationfrom a private sector standpoint toreally bring that to life for all of ourconsumers out there raj go aheadso um this may be an unpopular opinionbutthe reality is is that all softwarehas vulnerabilities and all softwarewill continue to have vulnerabilitiesand the more that we as consumers demandricher feature sets thosevulnerabilities will increasewhat we have to do is we have to developa system or a mechanism by whichwe as the good team actuallyidentify those vulnerabilities work withthe vendorsand develop you know patches or updatesin order to be able to address thosethat’s andyou know we actually run a vulnerabilityresearch team andi can tell you there are many timeswe’ll go to companies and say look wefound a vulnerability ina critical device may be used in medicaloror any other scenario and in many casesthe responses we getaren’t positive it’s well don’t talk tous orspeak to our lawyers and so forth and soas aas a society we have to accept thatthere are vulnerabilities butanticipate and work on developingsecurity patches in order to be able toaddress thoseall right we have two minutes left andthere are a couple of questions herethat i think follow the same theme soi’ll throw it out to each of you umand i i think this is an important pointso here i think is the best articulationthey said for the groupare the days of attacks going quietlyand without disclosurecompletely over how does that impactcommunication and messaging to variousconstituentshow are your panelists recommending thatcompanies communicate aroundattacks and intrusions and ransomwareand i think what they’re getting tois um and maybe what the question ismissing a little bit ofis there there ransomware is just thetip of the icebreak that is the mostvisual element of the cyber threatlandscape todayyou know now it’s not just thatransomware groups are holding datahostagethey’re threatening to leak it out ifyou don’t pay sowhether a company wants to bury it ornot they have no choiceand then underneath that is this vastoceanof cyber attacks that never really seethe light of day and the companies arestill bearingbut just with the volume of ransomwarethat we’re seeingyou know what does this mean fordisclosure do you think that this hassort of takenout some of the um fear of companiescoming forward and reporting theseransomware attacks andand how does this how should companiescommunicate these threats and theseattacks tothe publicchris first off i want to say what rozjust said that is not an unpopularopinion that wasbang on i mean nailed it look we just weshould demand morethey should give us more secure productsbut we also have to live in anenvironment where we’re always preparedfor a bad daywe have to be able to respond to a badday whether it’s zero trustassume breach before it doesn’t matteruh continuous umuh evaluation monitoring and be ready torespondwhich goes to your question here nicoleof what i am seeing is the companiesin the organizations that aretransparent forthright they workclosely and effectively with thegovernment they communicatetransparently to the customers and thepublic are the ones thatultimately not just survive but alsothrive in an incident and look what’sreallyat stake here is again a word i just usetrustand once you lose that trust with thepublic with the government withwith you know the media you’re done it’sreally hard to bring that back so youwant to be able toengage effectively and it’s just beingpart really nowpart of being a good corporate citizenas much as anythingand it looks like we’re one minute overso i’m sorry we’ll wrapthere thank you so much everyone forjoining us and thank you toeveryone who tuned in today for what i’msure was your1000th uh zoo zoom webinar but we reallyappreciate itand um you know there are valuableresources out there and i would justagain highlightnomoreransom.org if you are hit byransomwarejoin the club thank you everyone and seeyousoonyou
Ransomware attacks on Colonial Pipeline and a top meat producer, JBS, have catapulted ransomware into the mainstream. In recent years, thousands of schools, government agencies, healthcare providers, and small businesses have fallen prey to it, but these localized incidents failed to trigger an aggressive response to match this scourge—until now. Ransomware represents a direct threat to national security, physical and digital infrastructure, and individual wellbeing. Learn how industry, government, and civil society are confronting this challenge head-on and turning the tables on computer criminals.
Speakers
Sean Joyce, Global and US Cybersecurity, Privacy & Forensics Leader, PwC; Former Deputy Director, FBI
Christopher Krebs, Former Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; Senior Newmark Fellow in Cybersecurity Policy, Aspen Digital
Raj Samani, Chief Scientist, McAfee; Founder, No More Ransom
Kemba Walden, Assistant General Counsel, Digital Crimes Unit, Microsoft
Moderated by Nicole Perlroth, Journalist, The New York Times
Sean Joyce
Global and US Cybersecurity, Privacy & Forensics Leader, PwC; Former Deputy Director, FBI
Sean Joyce is a Principal in PwC’s Advisory Practice, where he is the Global & US Cybersecurity, Privacy and Forensics practice leader and a member of the US Advisory Leadership Team. Sean has worked with many clients in providing strategic guidance, investigative support, technological changes, incident breach response and cyber security advice. He has consulted in some of the most prolific cyber breaches, providing guidance and expertise to top executives. Sean has also briefed many boards and senior executives on the challenges posed by the digital revolution Prior to rejoining PwC, Sean was the Chief Trust Officer at Airbnb where he led Design Specialists, Product Managers, Engineers and Data Scientists to help grow and defend the platform. Sean also served as the Deputy Director with the FBI and had daily oversight of the 36,000 men and women of the FBI and its $8 billion annual budget. With more than 26 years of service in the FBI, Sean brought a wide range of operational and leadership experience. He was an integral part of transforming the FBI into an intelligence-driven organization. Sean is a 2013 recipient of the Director of National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the CIA Director’s Award, the DIA’s Director’s Award, the FBI Meritorious Medal, and the 2011 Presidential Rank Award.
Christopher Krebs
Former Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; Senior Newmark Fellow in Cybersecurity Policy, Aspen Digital
Chris Krebs is a founding partner of the Krebs Stamos Group, Senior Newmark Fellow in Cybersecurity Policy at Aspen Digital, and previously served as the first director of the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). As Director, Mr. Krebs oversaw CISA’s efforts to manage risk to the nation’s businesses and government agencies, bringing together partners to collectively defend against cyber and physical threats. At CISA, Mr. Krebs also pioneered the Rumor Control program, which was designed to counter disinformation campaigns. Before serving as CISA Director, Mr. Krebs served in various roles at the Department of Homeland Security, responsible for a range of cybersecurity, critical infrastructure and national resilience issues. Prior to his time at DHS, he directed U.S. cybersecurity policy for Microsoft. He also served in the George W. Bush Administration, advising DHS leadership on domestic and international risk management and public-private partnership initiatives. Mr. Krebs holds a Bachelor’s degree in Environmental Sciences from the University of Virginia and a J.D. from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University.
Raj Samani
Chief Scientist, McAfee; Founder, No More Ransom
Raj Samani is Chief Scientist and McAfee Fellow for cybersecurity firm McAfee. He has assisted multiple law enforcement agencies in cybercrime cases, and is a special advisor to the European Cybercrime Centre in The Hague. Samani has been recognized for his contribution to the computer security industry through numerous awards, including the Infosecurity Europe hall of Fame, Peter Szor award, and Intel Achievement Award, among others. He is the coauthor of the book “Applied Cyber Security and the Smart Grid” and the “CSA Guide to Cloud Computing,” as well as technical editor for numerous other publications.
Kemba Walden
Assistant General Counsel, Digital Crimes Unit, Microsoft
Kemba Eneas Walden is an Assistant General Counsel in Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) responsible for launching and leading DCU’s Ransomware Program. Kemba started her career at Microsoft as Senior Counsel for Cyber and Democracy providing legal counsel to the Defending Democracy Program through the 2020 Presidential Election. Prior to Microsoft, Kemba spent a decade in government service at the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining DHS in 2009, Kemba practiced international trade law at the U.S. Department of Commerce and in private practice. Kemba graduated from Hampton University in Hampton, Virginia with a B.A. in Political Science, from Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs with a Master in Public Affairs, and from Georgetown University Law Center. Kemba also holds a Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) in the Law of Data Security & Investigations.
Nicole Perlroth
Journalist, The New York Times
Nicole Perlroth is an award-winning cybersecurity journalist for The New York Times, where her work has been optioned for both film and television. She is a regular lecturer at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and a graduate of Princeton University and Stanford University. She lives with her family in the Bay Area, but increasingly prefers life off the grid in their cabin in the woods.
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2026 Aspen Cyber Summit hosted in Washington, D.C. celebrated 11 years of dialogue across government, industry, and civil society to create a safer world, online and off.